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1 Doxasticism vs. Experientialism about Our Ac-
cess to Reasons
It is very common to endorse doxasticism about our awareness of normative (or justi-
fying) reasons, according to which we can recognise our reasons for forming attitudes
or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs. In other
words, it is often assumed that we can identify things (e.g. facts, considerations, men-
tal states or episodes, etc.) that do constitute reasons for us and discriminate them
from things that do not only by means of judging or believing that things of the ﬁrst
kind (but not of the second) are reasons for us.1
Take the case of two people who both see that a third person is injured and in
distress. While one of the two recognises that she has a reason to help the hurt (and
subsequently helps him), the other fails to do so (e.g. because of a lack of moral sen-
sitivity). What doxasticism maintains is that the basic difference between the two is
that only the ﬁrst has formed the judgement or belief that she has a reason to help
the third person (and is acting accordingly).
Similarly, of two people, who have read the same newspaper article about the po-
litical situation in a rather unknown country, only one of them may take the article to
provide them with a reason to believe that the government of the country in question
needs to resign or be removed (e.g. because one of the two does not trust the news-
paper concerned). Again, according to doxasticism, the two people differ primarily in
1 Among the many philosophers who endorse doxasticism are Kant, (1785/1999), Sellars, (1956/1997),
Davidson, (1982), McDowell, (1998), Dancy, (2000, e.g. p. 126) and Setiya, (2011, e.g. p. 131). Indeed,
their endorsement is typically implicit – rather than explicit – in that they normally do not even con-
sider the possibility that doxasticism might be false. Note also that doxasticists need not claim – al-
though many of them do claim – that motivation or justiﬁcation require the recognition of reasons. For
instance, it is compatible with doxasticism that someone acts for a reason without having any relevant
normative belief.
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their normative judgements or beliefs (as well as in their subsequent belief about the
country).
One of the main problems with doxasticism is that it renders the following triad
of claims jointly inconsistent (the same point may perhaps also be made with respect
to certain higher animals):
(1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) re-
quires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason.
(2) Infants are capable of being motivated.
(3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief.
It should be clear that (3) is true. Infants cannot form normative judgements or beliefs
of the form ‘this gives me a reason to believe p, or to do A’, given that they neither
possess normative concepts (like ‘reason’), nor are they capable of reﬂective thought,
partly because they lack a proper ﬁrst-personal conception of themselves. So doxasti-
cists have to reject either (1) or (2) (or both). But this forced choice may be understood
as a dilemma for doxasticism.
On the hand, doxasticists may adopt a Kantian approach and reject the idea that
infants are capable of forming attitudes or performing actions in a motivated way –
precisely because motivation presupposes the doxastic recognition of reasons, and
because infants lack the capacity to doxastically recognise reasons.2 But this choice
seems to wrongly reduce the responses of infants to reﬂexes or instinctive reactions
(i.e. to animal-like behaviour). When infants reach for some object that caught their
attention or start to cry when their parents leave the room, their behaviour can be
made perfect sense of in terms of motives (e.g. that they want to take a closer look
at the object, or to be near to their parents). Moreover, it does not seem to differ
substantially (other than in aspects of execution and control) from the comparable
behaviour of adults who pick up an object because they want to investigate it further,
or call after their beloved one because they do not want them to leave.
On the other hand, doxasticists may choose a Humean route and deny that moti-
vation is a matter of (recognising and responding to) reasons. Instead, they espouse a
purely causal or teleological account of motivation.3 In this way, they can accommo-
date the observation that the responses of infants are motivated, despite the fact that
infants do not possess the conceptual and reﬂective capacities required for norma-
tive judgement or belief. But they pay the price of detrimentally ignoring the rational
nature of (some instances of) motivation. That our formation of attitudes and per-
formance of actions are (at least sometimes) intelligible from the rational perspective
2 See, for instance, Davidson, (1982), as well as Kant, (1785/1999) and McDowell, (1998, pp. 29f. and
108ff.) on the comparable case of higher animals..
3 See, for instance, Hume, (1739/2007, § 2.3.3), Mele, (2003, Ch. 2) and Smith, (1994, Introduction).
Note that, although Smith and other Humeans talk of ‘motivating’ or ‘explaining reasons’, they strictly
distinguish these from normative (i.e. justifying) reasons. When I speak of ‘reasons’, I have always
normative reasons in mind.
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is evidenced by the fact that we can – and do – justify them by reference to relevant
facts, considerations, mental states or episodes, and so on. When asked why we have
picked up an object or called someone back, we do not merely provide a causal expla-
nation, but point to reasons for performing these actions – that is, for things that we
take to speak in favour of the actions (e.g. that we need to ﬁnd out how the object
works, or that we have the strong desire not to be separated from our beloved one).
The doxasticists are therefore trapped between the two options of over- and of
underintellectualising motivation. The Kantians demand too much of motivation by
requiring the involvement of normative judgement or belief – with the adverse result
that they erroneously fail to count infants as being capable of motivated responses.
The Humeans, on the other hand, demand too little of motivation by not requiring
any recognition of, or responses to, reasons – meaning that they wrongly deny that
the attitudes and actions of us (i.e. both adults and infants) could be rational.
One elegant way of avoiding this dilemma is to give up doxasticism and instead
endorse experientialism – the view that we enjoy some experiential access to reasons,
which is independent of, and perhaps more fundamental than, our capacity to form
normative judgements and beliefs.4 In this paper, I would like to provide an argument
for the existence of such a non-doxastic form of access to reasons. More speciﬁcally, I
aim to defend the view – which I have called elsewhere experiential rationalism (Dorsch,
2011, Introduction) – that our basic awareness of reasons for us is phenomenal in nature.
What this means is that it forms part of our access from the inside to those of our mental
episodes, that provide us with reasons either by constituting the reasons themselves,
or alternatively by bringing us into contact with reason-constituting facts or consider-
ations. In other words, when we introspectively attend to those reason-giving mental
episodes and what they are about, we have the impression of the presence of a reason
for us.
Experientialists need not assume that reasons are phenomenally present to us.
They could instead maintain that our access to reasons is perceptual or emotional.
However, it is not only difficult to identify actual endorsements of this alternative
to experiential rationalism view. But taking our experiential access to reasons to be
sensory or affective also does not enjoy much plausibility. Most important, reason-
constituting things do not differ from other things in being linked to a distinctive
visual look or emotional feeling, which would allow us to discriminate the two kinds
of thing from each other. In addition, at least emotional responses are themselves
subject to rational assessment, thus posing the threat of a malicious form of regress.
For if our emotional recognition of our reason to perform a certain action is itself in
need of rational support, it has to be based on a further emotional feeling making us
aware of our reason to have our ﬁrst affective response; and so on.5
4 Note that doxasticism and experientialism need not disagree about the non-inferentiality of our
basic recognition of reasons. For doxasticists may insist that the relevant normative judgements or
beliefs are intuitive in nature, rather than being the result of reasoning.
5 The same problem might actually arise for normative judgements or beliefs, too. But doxasticists
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My defence of experiential rationalism – as an alternative to both doxasticism and
the perceptual or emotional versions of experientialism – focuses exclusively on per-
ceptual reasons for ﬁrst-order beliefs about the external world. I aim to argue for our
phenomenal access to other kinds of reason – including practical ones – elsewhere.6
Including this introductory section, the chapter consists of ﬁve parts.
In the second one, I argue that the best interpretation of the dispute between in-
tentionalists and sense-data theories about the signiﬁcance of hallucinations for theo-
ries of perception involves the claim that, from the inside, our perceptual experiences
seem (rightly or wrongly) to be genuine relations to external objects. The following
section describes this impression of relationality in more detail and concludes that it
involves an impression of determination by the objects of perception and their per-
ceived features. The fourth section defends the claim that this impression of deter-
mination constitutes one particular (i.e. the perceptual) way of being experientially
aware of reasons for belief. In seeming to be determined by external objects and their
features, perceptual experiences appear from the inside to provide us with a reason
to ascribe in belief those features to those objects. In the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section, I
point out that the resulting impression of perceptual reason-provision is neither sen-
sory (or experiential), nor intellectual (or cognitive), thus embodying a second kind
of introspectively accessible, non-sensory aspects of mental episodes, in addition to
what is sometimes called ‘cognitive phenomenology’ (Bayne and Montague, 2011).7 I
argue that aspects of this second non-sensory kind are best understood as structural
aspects of mental episodes (i.e. aspects that do not vary among the distinct instances
of a given kind of mental episode); and that the debate about the existence of non-
sensory aspects of mental episodes should focus on these aspects, rather than (just)
on intellectual aspects.
2 The Argument from Hallucination
The crucial element in our impression of perceptual reason-provision is the seeming
relationality of perceptual experiences. That perceptual experience do appear to be
relational from the inside becomes apparent in the debate about hallucinations and,
in particular, about the signiﬁcance of the sense-data version and the intentionalist
version of the argument from hallucination. It is therefore necessary to take a closer
look at this debate.
have still the option to argue that normative judgements are self-justifying – for instance, because they
involve rational intuition (Bealer, 2002), or because they concern conceptual normative truths. Neither
option is open to experientialists that take our access to reasons to be emotional, given that emotional
feelings cannot justify themselves.
6 To some extent, I already started to work on this project in Dorsch, (2009b) with respect to
reasons for judging and for acting, and in Dorsch, (2013) with respect to perceptual reasons.
7 Strictly speaking, ‘cognitive phenomenology’ is a misnomer, given that, traditionally, phenomenol-
ogy is a method of describing and investigating mental episodes and other things from the inside, and
not a synonym for ‘phenomenal character’ (i.e. what mental episodes are like for us from the inside).
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Naive realism about perceptual experiences claims that these experiences relate
us to external objects and features – that is, to objects that exist, and to features
that are instantiated by those objects, independently of being experienced by us.8
The view is naive in so far as it intends to take appearances at face value. That is, it
maintains that perceptual experiences are exactly like they seem to be from the inside
(or in introspection).9 Accordingly, naive realists assume that perceptual experience
are given to us from the inside as relations to external entities. That this assumption
is at the core of naive realism becomes apparent if we consider two traditional ways
of arguing against naive realism, both of which make essential use of the possibility
of perfect (or perception-like) hallucinations.
Perfect hallucinations are experiences that are, from the inside, indistinguishable
from veridical perceptions, but do not relate us to any external objects or features.
They are problematic for naive realism since they constitute a counterexample to the
claim that all perceptual experiences are relations to external objects, at least on the
assumption that perfect hallucinations are perceptual experiences. Because of this
challenge, it has been common to reject naive realism by denying either that percep-
tual experiences are relational, or that they relate us external entities.10 Sense-data
theory, for example, may be supported by the following sense-data argument from hallu-
cination:11
(i) Perceptual experiences are essentially relationally linked to their objects of aware-
ness.
(ii) There can be perfect hallucinations, which are experiences that are not rela-
8 According to a stronger understanding, it claims that perceptual experiences make us relationally
aware of external entities (Martin, 2002b; Nudds, 2009). In Dorsch and Soldati, (2016), Gianfranco
Soldati and me argue that naive realism is compatible with treating perceptual experiences as involving
intentional awareness.
9 In what follows, I use ‘access from the inside’ and ‘introspection’ interchangeably. I thus assume
that introspection need not be limited to our capacity for introspective judgements, but may also in-
clude a phenomenal (or experiential) form of awareness of, or attention to, our own mental episodes.
In Dorsch, (2013), I have argued – contrary to Martin, (2006, 41ff.) – that this phenomenal awareness
from the inside is distinct from, and prior to, our capacity for introspective judgements in the sense
that it can occur without introspective judgement, but not vice versa, given that introspective judge-
ments are based on instances of phenomenal awareness (compare, for instance, Peacocke, (2009) on
our awareness of our own actions). Being phenomenally aware of a mental episode simply means hav-
ing or enjoying a conscious mental episode – for instance, experiencing, thinking or feeling something
– and requires neither the possession of the ‘I’-concept, nor the possession of mental concepts, such
as ‘thinking’ or ‘judging’ (Dorsch, 2013; Dorsch and Soldati, 2016).
10 One could also deny both in the light of the possibility of hallucinations and thus endorse the view
that perceptual experiences make us intentionally aware of sense data. But this is both unnecessary
and implausible (especially if sense-data are conceived of as experience-dependent), explaining why
this position has, as far as I know, never been defended.
11 The argument is sometimes presented in terms of fundamental mental kinds of experience rather
than in terms of essences (Martin, 2004b). But I do not think that it matters for what follows whether
the crucial issue is whether veridical perceptions and hallucinations are of the same fundamental mental
kind, or rather whether they share the same nature.
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tionally linked to external objects of awareness.
(iii) Perfect hallucinations are essentially perceptual experiences.
(iv) Hence, perceptual experiences are essentially linked to non-external objects of
awareness.
Although it is not easy to ﬁnd explicit statements of arguments like this in the writ-
ings of sense-data theorists (whether they are indirect realists or idealists), it is clear
that many of them endorse all three premisses. Premiss (ii) is just the observation that
perfect hallucinations are possible; while premiss (iii) expresses the view that veridical
perceptions and perfect hallucinations are experiences of the same fundamental kind,
that is, with the very same nature. Both premisses have been relatively uncontrover-
sial until the (re)emergence of relationalist theories of perception that are paired with
direct realism (*). Premiss (iii), on the other hand, has been identiﬁed most closely
with sense-data theory and has been the primary target of its opponents. The follow-
ing exemplary quotations bear witness to the fact that premiss (i) is indeed explicit
in sense-data theory, given that the claim about the relationality of perceptual expe-
riences is nothing but the claim that the second relatum – the object of awareness –
always exists:
When I say ‘This table appears brown to me’ it is quite plain that I am acquainted
with an actual instance of brownness (or equally plainly with a pair of instances
when I see double). This cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident
and indubitable. (Price, 1981, p. 63)
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether there
is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt
whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato
was really a reﬂection; perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination. One
thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and some-
what bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and
having a certain visual depth, and that this whole ﬁeld of colour is directly present
to my consciousness. What the red patch is, whether it is physical or psychical
or neither, are questions that we may doubt about. But that something is red and
round then and there I cannot doubt. (Price, 1981, p. 3)
(Phenomenal Principle) If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something
which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which
the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality. (Robinson, 1994,
p. 32)
However, the modus ponens of the sense-data theorists is the modus tollens of the in-
tentionalists. For, according to the intentionalist argument from hallucination, we should
reject premiss (i) precisely on the basis of the other two premisses and the negation
of the conclusion (iv):
(iv*) Perceptual experiences are essentially linked to external objects of awareness.
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(ii) There can be perfect hallucinations, which are experiences that are not rela-
tionally linked to external objects of awareness.
(iii) Perfect hallucinations are essentially (* the same as veridical) perceptual experi-
ences.
(i*) Hence, perceptual experiences are essentially non-relationally linked to their ob-
jects of awareness.
Intentionalists support their central premiss (iv*) by reference to the so-called trans-
parency of experience. The idea that perceptual (and other kinds of) experience are
transparent can be understood in different ways. The strongest reading can be found
expressed in passages like the following:
‘[B]lue’ is as much an object, and as little a mere content, of my experience, when
I experience it, as the most exalted and independent real thing of which I am
ever aware. [...] [It] is as truly and really not a part of my experience, as anything
which I can ever know. (Moore, 1903, 450f.)
Focus your attention on a square that has been painted blue. Intuitively, you are
directly aware of blueness and squareness as out there in the world away from you,
as features of an external surface. Now shift your gaze inward and try to become
aware of your experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects. Try to focus
your attention on some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it
from other experiences, something other than what it is an experience of. The
task seems impossible: one’s awareness seems always to slip through the experi-
ence to blueness and squareness, as instantiated together in an external object.
(Tye, 1995, 30f.)
According to the stronger reading, perceptual experiences are transparent in the sense
that attention to them from the inside reveals nothing but external objects of aware-
ness and their features. In particular, it discloses neither non-external objects of
awareness (e.g. sense-data or inner pictures that depend for their existence on be-
ing experienced by us), nor features of the perceptual experiences themselves other
than their property of being experiences of certain external objects with certain fea-
tures. Weaker readings agree that the only objects of perception open to introspective
attention seem to be external. But they leave it open whether we have access from
the inside to other features of perceptual experiences:
There is a positive and a negative side to the claim here: that one does encounter
the mind-independent world in experience; and that one encounters nothing else.
We might call the positive thesis Transparency: that the character of one’s experi-
ence involves in some sense, or is directed on or of the mind-independent objects
and their features which we take to be around us in our environment. (Martin,
2004b, ch.1, p. 31)
This weaker understanding of the transparency of experience suffices to support pre-
miss (iv*). If perceptual experiences are transparent in the sense that, if we attend to
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them from the inside, we notice the objects of perception and their externality, then
we have introspective evidence for the claim that perceptual experiences are essen-
tially experiences of external objects.12
There are generally good reasons to reject sense-data theory – not the least natu-
ralist worries about the ontological status of sense-data and worries about the indeter-
minacy of sense-data (e.g. when what we are seeing is partly occluded by something
else, so that our experience leaves us in the dark with respect to the shape or colour of
the hidden part of the object perceived). But this does not mean that direct realists
(whether they are intentionalists or relationalists about awareness) should not take
the argument from hallucination in support of sense-data serious. In particular, that
the conclusion (iv) of this argument is false does not entail that the central premiss (i)
is completely unsupported.13
Sense-data theorists take the truth of (i) to be obvious, as the passages quoted
above illustrate. For them, it is ‘absolutely evident and indubitable’ that, whenever we
have a perceptual experience, there exist something that we perceive and are related
to. This also explains why sense-data theorists typically do not try to support (i) by
further argument.14 Now, intentionalists and other opponents of sense-data theory
have basically two options available to them. Either they dismiss the statements about
the obviousness of (i) as completely misguided; or they accept that there is really a
sense in which (i) is obvious, albeit one which does not decide the case in favour of
sense-data theory.
Choosing the ﬁrst option amounts to questioning the ability of sense-data theo-
rists to distinguish what is obvious about perceptual experience from what is not. But
this would be a highly uncharitable approach, since it ascribes a very fundamental er-
ror to sense-data theorists, namely the error of taking something to be obvious which
is not. It is highly unlikely that all – or even any – of the philosophers concerned (i.e.
Hume, Moore, Price, etc.) would have made such a basic error, and would have in-
sisted on making it when being confronted with people who did not believe (i) to be
true.
This leaves us with the second option of trying to ﬁnd a more charitable expla-
nation of why sense-data theorists have thought that the relationality of perceptual
12 There is certainly room for controversy about which aspects of the phenomenal character of
mental episodes – that is, which of their features that are accessible from the inside – are essential
to the episodes concerned. But the externality of their objects is surely among the most plausible
candidates: if this is not an essential aspect of the experiences, than nothing is.
13 Indeed, premiss (i) need not even be false, as disjunctivists and other proponents of the combi-
nation of direct realism and relationalism would argue. The culprit might instead be premiss (iii). See,
for instance, Snowdon, (1992) and Martin, (2000) for discussion.
14 Even Robinson, (1994, chs. 6f.) provides only an indirect argument for what calls the ‘Phenomenal
Principle’ (see the passage quoted earlier), namely by arguing against the two main alternative interpre-
tations of the alleged common element in veridical perception and hallucination (i.e. the intentionalist
and the adverbialist interpretation). See also the discussions in Burnyeat, (1979), Snowdon, (1992), Mar-
tin, (2000) and Brewer, (2011), to which I am heavily indebted in this section, not the least for raising
the issue of how to interpret the sense-data theorists’ position in the most charitable way.
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experiences is obvious. The kind of obviousness at play is certainly not the undenia-
bility of necessary truths, given that premiss (i) does not state such a truth. Rather, we
should assume that it derives from the special authority of introspective judgement.
In other words, it is most charitable to assume that, at least to sense-data theorists,
it is evident from the inside that perceptual experiences are relational. But if it is
evident to them, it should be evident to all of us, assuming that our introspective
capacities and perceptual experiences do not differ substantially from those of the
sense-data theorists.
That we possess evidence from the inside for the relationality of perceptual ex-
periences, however, does not imply that many of the closely related claims of the
sense-data theorists are true. First of all, access from the inside may still leave room
for doubt or for potential counter-evidence. It is true that there is a strong tradition
in philosophy – exempliﬁed, for instance, by Descartes, (1641) and Hume, (1739/2007)
– to assume that introspective evidence always has the last (or the only) word on the
nature of our mental episodes, or that it is inconceivable that introspection might
mislead us about this nature. But there are good reasons to reject this traditional as-
sumption of the indubitability or infallibility of our access from the inside (see, e.g.,
Shoemaker, (1996, especially chs. 2f. and 11)). Relatedly, acknowledging that we have
evidence from the inside for the relationality of perceptual experiences does not nec-
essarily mean accepting that they are relational. Intentionalists, for example, can still
insist that there are good reasons to reject premiss (i). However, in support of this
rejection, they cannot just point to the intentionalist argument from hallucination,
since its main premiss (iv*) about the externality of the objects of perception is sim-
ply grounded in the transparency of experience. Premiss (iv*) is thus backed up by
evidence of the same kind and strength as premiss (i), namely evidence from the in-
side. And we have no reason to prefer one over the other, unless we also consider
evidence from the outside.
As a result, introspection speaks equally for (or against) intentionalism and for
(or against) sense-data theory.15 For the best explanation of the fact that both inten-
tionalists and sense-data theorists point to the possibility of perfect hallucinations in
support for their own view is that both notice our evidence from the inside for their
main premiss (and ignore such evidence for the main premiss of their opponents).
That is to say, introspection tells us (rightly or wrongly) that perceptual experiences
are both relational and of external objects.
Indeed, a good case can be made for the claim that already the transparency of
15 In fact, our evidence from the inside does indeed favour naive realism, the conjunction of the
premisses (i) and (iv*). So, on the basis of evidence from the inside alone, we should perhaps rather
give up premiss (iii) – as suggested, for instance, by Martin, (2004b). Note that premiss (iii) is not
supported by introspection. That two experiences are indistinguishable for us from the inside does not
necessarily mean that they are of the same fundemental kind. Instead, our access from the inside may
not be sensitive to all differences in nature between veridical perceptions and perfect hallucinations –
just like our sense of vision, say, is not sensitive to differences between real fruits and perfect waxen
imitations (Martin, 2004a; Martin, 2006; Williamson, 1990).
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perceptual experience includes not only an impression of externality, but also an im-
pression of relationality. That veridical perceptions are transparent means, minimally,
that, if we attend to them from the inside, we notice the objects of perception and
their externality. That is, we notice that our veridical experiences make us aware of
external objects.16 But there are several ways in which mental episodes (as well as
mental states) may make us aware of entities.
Consider ﬁrst the contrast between the judgemental thought (or occurrent belief)
that it rains and the occurrent desire that it rains. Both make us aware of the same
proposition, but they do so in different ways. The judgemental thought regards the
proposition as something that is true, while the occurrent desire regards it as some-
thing that is to be made true. This is simply part of the fact that judging (or believing)
and desiring are distinct propositional attitudes. Judgemental thoughts and occurrent
desires do not merely present us with propositions, they are also non-neutral about
the status of those propositions – that is, about whether the propositions are true,
or instead should be made true. Assuming that true propositions are, or correspond
to, obtaining facts, the two attitudes are thus non-neutral about the status of those
facts, too – that is, about whether the facts obtain, or instead should obtain. This dif-
ference in attitude is reﬂected by the fact that judgemental thoughts and occurrent
desires provide answers to different questions, namely ‘what is the world like?’ and
‘what should the world be like?’ (or, alternatively, ‘what do we want the world to be
like?’).17
Althought veridical perceptions are not propositional attitudes, they are also non-
neutral with respect to what they present us with, namely external objects and fea-
tures. Seeing a green apple is more than just being aware of a green apple. We are
also aware of the apple as part of our current environment, that is, as something that
exists in our surroundings (an aspect which is lacking, for instance, when we sim-
ply visualise a green apple). In other words, our perceptual experience is non-neutral
about the existence of the apple in our actual environment. This parallel with judge-
mental thought is highlighted by the fact both veridical perceptions and judgemental
thoughts are meant to be answers to the same question, namely ‘what is the world
16 I limit the discussion here to veridical perceptions in order to be able to use the success verbs
‘be aware’ and ‘notice’ to describe the situation. But, of course, if perfect hallucinations do not differ
essentially from veridical perceptions (i.e. if intentionalism is right), then they will be transparent
as well, though only to intentional (i.e. not necessarily existing) objects. By contrast, relationlists
about perception are likely to question whether hallucinations are transparent in the same sense as
perceptions, given that they do – or should – maintain that we cannot really say much about the nature
of hallucinations, at least on the basis of the evidence available to us from the inside (Dorsch, 2010a;
Dorsch, 2013; Martin, 2004a; Martin, 2006). Hallucinations just (wrongly) seem to make us aware of
external and existing objects.
17 Velleman, (2000) describes this difference in terms of some attitudes regarding propositions as
true, and others regarding them as to be made true, while Martin, (2002b) draws the contrast by refer-
ence to merely semantic representation (i.e. what is common to both judgement and desire) and stative
representation (what is exclusive to judgement and the like).
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like?’.18
So, to return to the transparency of perceptual experience, when we attend to our
veridical perceptions from the inside, we do not merely notice the external objects
that they make us aware of, but we also notice these objects as part of our current
environment. That is, we notice them as existing in our surroundings. This impres-
sion of existence might sometimes be misleading, namely if it also pertains to how
hallucinations are given to us from the inside. But when we attend from the inside
to our veridical perceptions, their objects are rightly revealed both as external and as
existing. Now, noticing that the objects of perception exist may very well be under-
stood as amounting to noticing that we stand in a genuine relation to those objects
(i.e. are linked to them in a way that requires the existence of both relata). In this
sense, the transparency of perceptual experience provides us also with evidence for
the relationality of perception, and not only with evidence for the externality of its
objects. However, the link between the impression of existence and the impression
of relationality needs to be spelled out in more detail, which I intend to do in the next
section.
3 The Impression of Relationality
According to the considerations in the preceding section, we have good reason to
assume that perceptual experiences seem, from the inside, to be relations to exter-
nal objects and their features. But my overall aim is to motivate the claim that they
seem to provide us with reasons for belief – that is, the claim that such epistemic
reasons are phenomenally present to us in perception. The connective link between
the impression of relationality and the impression of reason-provision consists in the
speciﬁc way in which perceptual experiences are given to us as relational. It is there-
fore necessary to provide an analysis of what it means for perceptions to appear to
be relational from the inside. In this analysis, I rely heavily on my phenomenological
description of what perceptual experiences are like in Dorsch, (2010a).
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the impression of relationality is that
perceptual experiences appear to be about something distinct from them. Without
this impression of distinctness, experiences would not be given to us as object-directed
at all (Kant, 1781/1990, B38) – as, arguably, feelings of boredom or depression are.
However, from the inside, the objects of perception do not merely seem to be distinct
from our experiences. They also appear to be objects of a certain ontological category,
18 Note that other kinds of visual experience are non-neutral as well. Our experience of what Las
Meninas depicts, for instance, is non-neutral about how many children there are (minimally) in the
depicted room (i.e. there are at least four according to the picture); while our imaginative experience
of a tree is likely to be non-neutral about whether it is in blossom, say, or defoliated. The difference to
perceptual experience is that pictorial or imaginative experiences are not – or at least not by default
– non-neutral about our actual surroundings. That is, they do not present answers to the question of
how our environment is like, but rather to the question of how some imagined, depicted or otherwise
ﬁctional situation is like.
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and to stand in a certain relation to our perceptual experiences. I discuss these two
aspects in turn.
The Objects of Perception
First of all, our perceptual experiences seem to make us aware of particular objects,
that is, objects with a speciﬁc numerical identity. This means that we have the im-
pression that there is always an answer to the question of which speciﬁc object we are
perceiving – even if our perceptual experience does not by itself enable us to identify
the object. When we see just one of a pair of twins, we might not be able to deter-
mine whom of the two we are facing. But our experience still gives us the impression
that there is a deﬁnite answer to this question. If it did not, we would not rely on
our perceptions, say, when aiming to demonstratively refer to particular objects in
our environment.19 When we are visualising a man, on the other hand, we need not
visualise any particular man, and the question of which speciﬁc man we are visualising
may be unanswerable or even inappropriate.20
Then, perceptions seem to present us with concrete objects. That is, their objects
appear to be located at a particular point in time and/or space, depending on the sense
modality concerned. Just as in the case of numerical identity, the perceptual experi-
ences may not inform us in any detail about the exact spatiotemporal location of the
objects concerned (e.g. when we see something in the dark or in foggy conditions).
But we none the less have the impression that there is a deﬁnite answer to the ques-
tion of where the objects of perception are located. Indeed, it is natural to assume
that the impression of particularity and the impression of spatiotemporal location
are closely linked. The idea is that perceptual experiences seem to be about objects
with speciﬁc identities partly in virtue of seeming to be about objects with determi-
nate spatiotemporal locations, given that numerically distinct concrete objects can be
individuated by their spatiotemporal location.
Finally, as already noted in section I, perceptual experiences make us aware of
objects that seem to be experience-independent in their existence (and also in at least
some of their perceivable features). What this means is that the objects of perception
appear to be of such a kind that they can exist independently of being perceived by
us. When we look at a table or a person, we have the impression that their existence
does not depend on our particular experience of them.21 This impression is missing,
19 See Siegel, (2002) and Campbell, (2010). Compare also the arguments in Martin, 2002a and So-
teriou, 2000 for the involvement of an impression of particularity in perceptions. Indeed, both argue
that what our perceptual experiences are like from the inside is partly constituted by their speciﬁc ob-
jects. The phenomological salience of the particularity of the perceived objects has the consequence
that accounts, which assume that perceptual experiences possess only a general content (e.g., Dretske,
(1995) or Tye, (1995)), have serious difficulties to capture this phenomenal aspects (Martin, 2002a).
20 See Dorsch, (2017, ch. 8). Something similar is true of paintings of landscapes and other things
(see Wollheim, (1998, § VII) and Martin, (2001, § IV).
21 This still leaves room for a weaker form of mind-dependence, namely that their existence depends
on our general capacity to perceive them, though not on any particular manifestation of that capacity.
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for instance, in the case of afterimages which we take from the inside to be such that
they do not exist before or after being experienced by us. This is why we do not
believe that afterimages possess the same ontological status as, and are part of reality
like, the tables or persons that we perceive.
The Perceptual Relation
So, from the inside, perceptions seem to relate us to particular, concrete and expe-
rience-independent objects. But what does it mean that they appear to relate us to
them? There are at least two important aspects to this impression of relationality.
The ﬁrst is that – as already noted at the end of section 2 – perceived objects
appear to exist as part of our current environment, which means that they and their
features seem to be part of the actual world (i.e. reality). If we see a book, it seems to
be there, before our eyes – and not, say, merely in some imagined or ﬁctional situa-
tion, like when we visualise a book or see a depiction of one (Dorsch, 2010b; Martin,
2002b). More speciﬁcally, the objects of perception seem to exist in the present. This
means that perceptions present their objects as existing (more or less) simultaneously
with their own occurrence, and as being a certain way right at that very moment.22
Episodes of sensory recollection, by contrast, present their objects as having existed
and being a certain way in the past; while episodes of sensory imagination completely
lack this impression of existence.23
There is a straightforward explanation of why the impression of existence in the
present is part of the impression of relationality. Genuine relations entail the concur-
rent existence of all of their relata. So, in order for us to stand in a perceptual relation
to some object, this object has to exist. As a consequence, we are not fully aware of
the relationality of our perceptual experiences, unless we are aware of the existence
of the objects perceived.
McDowell, (1984/1998) argues (with respect to properties) that this weaker form of mind-dependence
constitutes a kind of objectivity, partly because it leaves room for error.
22 The qualiﬁcation is needed to deal with the fact that the causal process leading from the object
to the experience is normally extended in time. For instance, given that the speed of light is ﬁnite, our
visual perceptions always occur a tiny bit after the emission of light by the perceived objects. But the
temporal gaps are so small that they are usually below our threshold of discrimination. They become
problematic in the visual case only with respect to objects far away from us (e.g. distant stars) which
we may come to perceive some considerable time after they have gone out of existence. Besides, note
that Martin describes the ’presence’ of the perceived object in two different ways: in terms of spatio-
temporal closeness, and in terms of constitution or counterfactual determination (cf. Martin, 2001:
272f.). I would like to keep these two aspects apart, given that I do not want to rule out the possibility
that sensory memories are also constituted or determined by their past objects, and that this fact is
phenomenologically salient.
23 See Sartre, (1940/2004, ch. 1) and Martin, (2001). Of course, we can visualise existing objects
(e.g. our friend) and be aware of the fact that we are visualising something existing. But this take on
the existence of what is visualised is not part of our visual experience itself, but pertains to its wider
context, such as some additional thought (what Peacocke, (1985) calls ‘S-imagining’) or our awareness
of our own attempt at imaginative agency (Dorsch, 2012, § 3.6).
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But saying this much is compatible with the view that perception is intentional,
rather than genuinely relational. For both relationalists and intentionalists about per-
ception agree that veridical perceptions do link us to existing objects; and that hallu-
cinatory perceptual experiences are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical ones
in the sense that both seem to be, from the inside, to be veridical and to link us to
some existing object. Otherwise, we could not explain why perfect hallucinations lead
to belief, unless we are irrational or receive evidence from the outside that they are
hallucinatory (Dorsch, 2013; Dorsch and Soldati, 2016). Relationalists and intention-
alists disagree, however, about the modal status of the link between perceptions and
their existing objects. While intentionalists assume this link to be merely contin-
gent, relationalists take it to be necessary. In other words, while one and the same
intentional experience could occur without the existence of its object of intentional
awareness, one and the same relational experience could not occur without its object
of relational awareness.
This leads us directly to the second aspect of the impression of relationality. As
part of this impression, it does not merely seem to us as if the object perceived existed,
but also as if our perceptual experience would not have been numerically the same if
the object had not existed, and would cease to be numerically the same if the object
were to go out of existence. For instance, when we see a glass on the table before
us, it appears to us as if our perceptual experience would have been a different token
experience if the glass had not been there on the table. This is true even if the glass
would have been replaced by a distinct, but qualitatively identical glass. Although
we would not have been able to notice any difference from the inside, it would still
be part of our impression of the relationality of our experience that a change in the
numerical identity of the object perceived would lead to a change in the numerical
identity of the perceptual experience itself.
If perceptual experiences would not show this aspect, they would not be given
to us from the inside as genuinely relational (i.e. as requiring the existence of their
objects), but at best only as intentional (i.e. as not requiring the existence of their ob-
jects, or as staying neutral on this issue). Again, imaginative experiences seem to lack
this aspect, given that we do not assume them to require the existence of their objects
on the basis of our access to them from the inside. When we visualise a glass on some
table, we do not take the identity of our experience to be bound up with the existence
of the glass. Indeed, as already mentioned earlier, our imaginative experiences seem,
from the inside, to be such that they could occur without there being any particular
or existing glass that we are imagining. As a result, imaginative experiences involve at
best an impression of intentionality, but not one of relationality.
To forestall objections, it is important to note that the view proposed here does
not imply more than a minimal non-inferential access to modal status. First, the claim
is not that we perceive the object as having the property of being such that their non-
existence would have led to a numerically distinct experience. Rather, the claim is
that, on the basis of evidence from the inside, we take our perceptual experience to have
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the property of requiring the existence of its object. Second, access from the inside
amounts to more than non-inferential conscious or introspective awareness of the
mental episodes concerned. In particular, it also includes extended – and often (quasi-
)theoretical – reﬂection and reasoning on the deliverances of this non-inferential form
of awareness (Dorsch, 2013). In our case here, we ﬁrst notice non-inferentially that
there are certain apparent differences between perceptual and imaginative experi-
ences. But getting clearer about their speciﬁc nature (e.g. that they involve some
modal differences) may require that we consider these differences in more detail by
reﬂecting on and reasoning about them. In fact, this is what I have been doing all
along in this paper.24
The impression that our perceptual experiences seem to be dependent for their
existence and identity on the existence and identity of their objects may be described
as an impression of determination (or constitution, if one prefers): perceptual experi-
ences seem to be determined by their objects in so far as they would not have existed
without their objects, and would have been different experiences if they had had dif-
ferent objects. But this impression of determinantion is not limited to the existence
and the identity of the objects of perception. It also extends to their perceivable
features: how perceptual experiences present their objects as being seems to us to
depend on how those objects are like. When we look at a green apple, for example,
we have the impression that our experience would have been different (i.e. a red-
rather than a green-experience) if the apple had been red, or would cease to be the
same if the apple were to turn red.25 Once again, imaginative experiences differ in
this respect from perceptual ones, given that they do not seem to us to depend on the
perceivable features of some object. When we visualise an apple as green, we do not
have the impression that the greenness of some apple is responsible for this. If at all,
how our imaginative experience presents the apple as being seems to be determined
by our own mental agency or by some other, more passive factor internal to our mind
(e.g. memory, association, etc.).26
4 The Impression of Reason-Provision
In the second section, I argued that we can make sense of both the sense-data version
and the intentionalist version of the argument from hallucination only if we assume
that, from the inside, perceptual experiences seem to be relations to external objects.
24 Or, in fact, some phenomenologists like Husserl, (1901/1984).
25 A change in our point of view might also lead to a different experience, namely at least if it leads
to a change in which features of the object we are perceptually aware of (e.g. the apple’s red back rather
than it’s green front). It is an interesting question to ask whether the identity of an experience of us
also nomologically depends on our speciﬁc spatial point of view – whether, for instance, two perceptual
experiences, that make us aware of the same object and exactly the same features, albeit from different
spatial perspectives, are distinct.
26 I discuss the determination of perceptual and imaginative experiences and its phenomenological
salience at length in Dorsch, (2017, chs. 5ff.).
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The third section was then devoted to a more detailed description of the impression of
relationality involved in perception. From the inside, perceptual experiences seem to
be relational in so far as they appear to be determined by (or nomologically dependent
on) their external objects. In this fourth section, I would like to defend the idea
that this impression of determination amounts to an impression of the presence of a
perceptual reason for belief – at least in the case of veridical perceptual experiences.27
In the following, I assume that such experiences do provide us with reasons for
belief.28 That is, unless we are aware of any defeaters, seeing a green apple is suffi-
cient to justify – and move – us to believe that there is an apple and that the apple is
green. But I aim to stay neutral on the question of what perceptual reasons are. Per-
haps they are the facts (or, if one prefers, the property instances) that our veridical
perceptual experiences make us aware of. But maybe they are rather the experiences
themselves.29 In both cases, it makes sense to speak of the veridical perceptual experi-
ences as providing us with reasons: either they give us access to them, or they constitute
them.
But in virtue of which feature(s) do veridical perceptual experiences provide us
with reasons for belief? When trying to answer this question, the ﬁrst thing to note
is that these experiences make us aware of external objects in our environment and
some of their features. That is, they present certain parts of our actual surroundings
as being a certain way. For instance, we may see the apple on the table before us, and
we may see it as being green and fresh. Moreover, which objects veridical perceptual
experiences present us with, and how they present them as being, is determined by
(or nomologically depends on) the relevant parts of our surroundings. That there is
27 I ignore perfectly illusory and hallucinatory experiences for two reasons. First, to make the case
for the phenomenal presence of perceptual reasons, it suffices to concentrate on veridical perceptions.
Second, there is just not the space here to properly address the issue of illusions or hallucinations
since this would require to engage in much more detail with the various views on their nature and,
notably, on whether they possess any justiﬁcatory force (see Dorsch, (2013) and Dorsch, (2010b) for
discussion). However, if illusions or hallucinations do provide us with reasons for belief, they do so not
because they are determined by reality (since they are not, or not fully), but because they are experiences
of the very same kind as perceptual experiences and thus would have been nomologically dependent
on reality, had they occurred under more normal or more suitable conditions (i.e. conditions under
which they would not have counted as illusory or hallucinatory). Besides, there is the further issue of
whether we have any access from the inside to the nature of non-veridical experiences. For that they
are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions does not entail that they are experiences
of the same kind (Martin, 2004a; Martin, 2006). Hence, although we form the same introspective
beliefs about veridical and (perfect) non-veridical experiences, they need not constitute knowledge
in both cases. For instance, our speciﬁc introspective belief that one of our experiences possesses
justiﬁcatory power (e.g. based on an impression of reason-provision) may constitute knowledge if it is
about a veridical perception, but perhaps not if it is about a hallucination.
28 See Martin, (1992) for a good argument in support of this claim.
29 There is in fact a third candidate for perceptual reasons which, in some sense, combines the other
two: namely the fact that we are seeing some fact or property instance (Haddock, 2010; McDowell,
1998). But I take it that this option is equally compatible with what I am going to say than the two
alternatives mentioned in the main text.
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a bent banana before us (and that we are facing it with open eyes, in broad daylight,
and so on) is responsible for the fact that we see a banana, and also that we see it as
being bent.30 If the banana had been straight, we would have seen it as being straight.
If there had been a pear instead of the banana, we would have seen a pear, and not the
banana. And if there had been nothing on the table, we would not have seen anything
(over and above seeing the table).31
We can now see why veridical perceptual experiences provide us with reasons for
belief about the external world: namely precisely in virtue of the special way in which
they are connected to, and make us aware of, this world. How veridical perceptual
experiences present aspects of reality as being is nomologically dependent on how
those aspects are really like. Because of this, the experiences (or what they make us
aware of) speak for the truth of the corresponding propositions about reality. Seeing
a bent banana speaks in favour of – and thus provides us with a reason for – believing
that there is a banana which is bent. And it does so because we see the banana and see
it as bent due to the fact that there is a bent banana. Indeed, we could hardly receive
better evidential support for the belief that there is a banana with a certain shape
than by enjoying an experience of the banana that is determined by the actual shape
of the banana. In particular, experiences (or other kinds of mental episode) could
not be responsive in an epistemically more direct way than this to how our current
environment is qualitatively like.32
Of course, there are other ways in which mental episodes or states may provide
us with reasons for belief. That is, there are other ways in which episodes or states
(or what they are about) may speak for the truth of some proposition. For instance,
our knowledge-constituting belief that p and p! q provides us with a reason to be-
30 The same is true of colours, even if they turn out to be secondary qualities: which colour we see
the apple as having is determined by which colour it actually possesses. But if colours are secondary
qualities, which colour an object possesses depends again both on its reﬂectance properties and on how
the human visual system works (Dorsch, 2009a). Assuming that our visual system does not change
(or that colours are deﬁned in a rigid way by reference to our current visual system), it follows that
which colour we see the apple as having is (primarily) determined by which reﬂectance properties its
surface has. The only adjustment to be made is perhaps that the determinant features of objects need
not always be perceivable (given that we perhaps do not see reﬂectance properties, but only colours).
However, even shapes are ultimately determined or constituted by non-perceivable physical properties,
so that shape perception shows the same dependence on the non-perceivable.
31 It is worthwhile to point out that these considerations are in fact true irrespective of whether
perception is relational or intentional. For even intentionalists agree that veridical perception makes
us aware of existing objects, the perceivable nature of which determines how we perceive them as being
(Dorsch and Soldati, 2016; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995). Indeed, intentionalists may be able to accept that
the numerical identity of the objects perceived (if there are any) may also play a determining role with
respect to perceptual experience, even though such experience does not require the existence of its
objects (Martin, 2002a).
32 In order to be sensitive to differences in numerical identity (e.g. when grounding demonstrative
knowledge), something more might be needed, namely genuine relationality (see Siegel, (2002), Camp-
bell, (2010) and Martin, (2002a) for discussion). In this chapter, I focus solely on descriptive perceptual
knowledge about external objects.
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lieve q in so far as our belief (or the truth) of p and p! q speaks for the truth of q.
This suggests that we can understand the property of providing us with a reason for
belief as a determinable property that may be determined in different ways. While
knowledge-constituting beliefs, say, may possess this determinable property in virtue
of being formed in response to sufficient evidence for their own propositional content,
veridical perceptual experiences possess it in virtue of being determined by reality.
But, as I argued earlier, veridical perceptual experiences also involve the impres-
sion of relationality – that is, of being determined by the nature of their existing and
external objects. What this means is that we have access from the inside to the feature
in virtue of which the experiences provide us with reasons for belief. Veridical per-
ceptual experiences are reason-providing because of their nomological dependence
on reality; and they seem to us to be nomologically dependent on reality as part of
their apparent relationality. It is in this sense that perceptual reasons are phenomenally
present to us: from the inside, veridical perceptual experiences seem to possess a prop-
erty (i.e. the property of being determined by reality) which is a determinant of the
determinable property of being reason-providing.
This impression is phenomenal because it already occurs on the level of non-in-
ferential – and non-conceptual – access from the inside. For instance, we can no-
tice the difference in determination between perceptual and imaginative experiences
without having to engage in any form of reﬂection or reasoning. The latter are only
needed if we want to describe this difference in any detail. The situation is thus
analagous to our visual awareness of hues, say. We can discriminate different shades
of red without using our capacities for reﬂection and reasoning. This parallel is also
pertinent with respect to the shared independence from concepts. We need not be
able to conceptualise the difference between two shades of colour (other than per-
haps the concepts ‘this colour’ and ‘that colour’) in order to visually distinguish and
individuate them. Similarly, we do not have to possess the concepts ‘determination’
or ‘reason-provision’ (though perhaps the concepts ‘this episode’ and ‘that episode’)
in order to notice from the inside the difference in question between perceptual and
imaginative experiences.
Because of this independence of the conceptual and reﬂective capacities required
for normative judgement or belief, there is no principle barrier for infants to be ca-
pable of discriminating perceptual (and possibly other) reasons phenomenally – just
as they are capable of visually discriminating hues. Hence, experiential rationalism –
and, with it, experientialism more generally – can hold on to the claims (1), (2) and (3),
given that they are jointly inconsistency only on the assumption of doxasticism.
The categorisation of our impression of reason-provision as phenomenal also ﬁts
with standard terminology. It is natural to assume that those aspects or properties
of mental episodes that are are accessible from the inside constitute their phenomenal
character (i.e. what the episodes are like for us).33 Hence, the property of providing us
with reasons forms part of the phenomenal character of veridical perceptual experi-
33 See, for instance, (Martin, 2004b; Williamson, 1990), and also footnote 9.
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ences. And our awareness from the inside of this property is an instance of phenomenal
awareness, given that it makes us aware of an aspect of phenomenal character.
Given that there are different conceptions of reasons, there are also different
ways of further spelling out the description of the impression of reason-provision.
If perceptual reasons are identical with the facts perceived, they are phenomenally
present in so far as veridical perceptual experiences seem to be determined by the
reason-constituting facts). While both perceptual and imaginative experiences make
us aware of states of affairs (i.e. objects and their features), only the ﬁrst kind of ex-
perience phenomenally marks these states of affairs as obtaining and as constituting
reasons. The impression of reason-provision is then an impression of the provision of
access to reason-constituting facts. Alternatively, if perceptual reasons are identical
with the perceptual experiences themselves, they are phenomenally present in so far
as the reason-constituting experiences seem to be determined by external facts.34 In
this case, the experiences phenomenally mark themselves as reasons, and the impres-
sion of reason-provision is an impression of reason-constitution.
But whichever way of understanding reasons is to be preferred, both options have
in common that the central aspect of the impression of reason-provision is the im-
pression of determination by aspects of our actual environment, which is again part
of the impression of relationality. Moreover, the two alternatives share the view that
the impression is just one of the presence of some perceptual reason for belief.35 In
other words, the impression is neutral on which speciﬁc reason for belief is concerned.
In particular, it does not say anything about which speciﬁc belief it is a reason for. For
that a given veridical perceptual experience provides us with a reason for believing p
(rather than q) is not a matter of the relationality of the experience, but rather of its
content, that is, how it presents things as being. If the experience makes us aware of a
green apple, say, it provides us with a reason for believing that there is a green apple;
while if we experience a yellow banana, we have a reason to judge that there is a yellow
banana. The impression of the presence of a speciﬁc perceptual reason is thus the result
of the combination of the general impression of relationality and determination and
the particular impression of having a speciﬁc content.
5 Non-Sensory Aspects of Phenomenal Character
With the preceding section, I have ﬁnished making my case for experientialism about
our access to reasons and, in particular, for the idea that perceptual reasons are phe-
nomenally present in perceptual experience. This is a ﬁrst, good indication for the
34 It is an interesting question to ask, if reason-constituting facts determine perceptions, whether
they do so in a rational way, or merely by means of causation or constitution.
35 Indeed, the reason may be salient as a perceptual reason, meaning that it may seem to be, from
the inside, to be a special kind of epistemic reason, namely an epistemic reason that is conclusive (i.e.
on its own sufficient to ground belief and knowledge), but also merely prima facie (i.e. defeasible by
relevant counterevidence).
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truth of experiential rationalism, at least with respect to perceptual and other sensory
experiences. In the remainder of the chapter, I would like to highlight one particular
aspect of the philosophical signiﬁcance of the impression of reason-provision. For
its existence suggests that the recently prominent debate about whether our access
from the inside is limited to sensory aspects of experiences should not focus – or at
least not entirely – on intellectual aspects (i.e. what is sometimes called ‘cognitive
phenomenology’), but rather on structural aspects.
It has indeed been a central question in the recent philosophy of mind to ask
whether there are any non-sensory aspects of mental episodes that make a difference
from the inside. Sensory aspects of mental episodes are features that pertain to the
sensory (or experiential) presentation of objects and their features. For instance, two
visual experiences that differ in which colour or shape they make us aware of differ in
sensory presentation. There is wide agreement that such sensory aspects contribute
to how the mental episodes concerned appear to be like from the inside. But it is a
controversial issue whether our access from the inside is limited to sensory aspects.36
Typically, the debate about this issue focuses on the question of whether we enjoy
access from the inside to our thoughts. The main reason for this is that – at least to
a common view – experiences and thoughts make us aware of objects and their fea-
tures in very different ways. More speciﬁcally, the kind of presentation involved in
thought is not sensory, but intellectual (or cognitive). This raises the issue of whether
differences in thought content – that is, differences in the concepts or propositions
involved – are accessible from the inside, too. Experiences of red objects and experi-
ences of green objects seem to us to differ because they present their objects as having
different colours. So, the question is whether the same is true of thoughts about red
objects and thoughts about green objects – that is, whether we can notice from the
inside whether a given thought includes the employment of the concept ‘red’ rather
than that of the concept ‘green’. If the answer to this question turns out to be positive,
we have a good example of non-sensory aspects of mental episodes that are accessible
from the inside – namely intellectual aspects pertaining to thoughts.
However, the respective debate does not properly distinguish between three dif-
ferent issues: (i) whether non-sensory aspects are accessible from the inside; (ii) whe-
ther any aspects of thoughts are accessible from the inside; (iii) whether intellectual
aspects (of thoughts) are accessible from the inside. In particular, what is ignored is
the possibility that our access from the inside may extend to aspects of experiences
or thoughts that pertain neither to the sensory, nor to the intellectual presentation
of objects and their features. As a result, (i) is often wrongly reduced to (ii) or (iii).
One problem with this reduction is that the focus of the debate stays exclusively on
36 See, for instance, Carruthers and Veillet, (2011) or, more generally, the papers in (Bayne and Mon-
tague, 2011). Some philosophers deny altogether that we enjoy any access from the inside to our mental
episodes (Churchland, 1984; Dennett, 1991). Of course, if this radical scepticism should turn out to be
true, the whole approach adopted in this paper would be undermined. But there are good reasons to
reject the idea that our only – or even our primary – access to our experiences (and possibly also our
thoughts) is from the outside (Soldati, 2007).
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thoughts (or other propositional attitudes) and, especially, on their accessibility from
the inside.37 Fortunately, we can circumvent the whole issue of whether introspection
extends to thoughts by asking instead whether already perceptual experiences involve
non-sensory aspects that are accessible from the inside. In this way, we can avoid any
sceptical considerations about thoughts and start with the wide acknowledgement
that we do enjoy introspective access to experiences – the question is only to which
of their aspects.
In the light of the preceding observations about perceptual experiences, the an-
swer should clearly be that there is indeed another class of non-sensory aspects that
are accessible from the inside. For the impressions of relationality and reason-pro-
vision are neither sensory, nor intellectual. Instead, they belong to the class of what
may be called structural aspects. Structural aspects of mental episodes are charac-
terised by the fact that they do not vary between particular instances of a given kind
of episode. The relationality and reason-providing character are structural features
because they pertain to all perceptual experiences, and not only some. By contrast,
distinct experiences or thoughts usually differ in their sensory or intellectual aspects,
simply because they usually differ in what they make us aware of.
It is true that, as part of the impression of reason-provision, the objects of per-
ception appear to us to possess certain properties: they seem to be distinct from the
perceptual experiences concerned, to be concrete, to exist independently of being ex-
perienced, and to determine how they are experienced by us. But they do not appear
to have these properties in the same sensory way in which they seem to be red or
round, say. That is to say, we do not sensorily perceive properties like existence or
externality.
Indeed, if these properties were sensorily perceivable, there should be a speciﬁc
‘look’ that all existing and external objects share, but other objects lack, and which
would allow us to visually discriminate the ﬁrst from the second. However, there is
no such ‘look’, mainly for two reasons. First, we cannot perceptually experience an
object without it seeming to exist and be external. Hence, we cannot, just on the basis
of this impression, distinguish different kinds of object. Second, properties like exis-
tence or externality are – unlike perceivable Gestalt or other higher-level properties –
not systematically linked to certain sets of lower-level perceivable properties (such as
shapes, colours, textures, and so on). We can visually discriminate apples from other
fruits because they possess a characteristic size, shape, texture and range of colours.
By contrast, existing and external objects come in all kinds of sizes, shapes, textures,
colours, and so on.
Besides, it might be tempting to characterise all structural aspects as pertaining
to the attitude of the experiences and thoughts, while insisting that the sensory and
intellectual aspects pertain to their content. But this would be incorrect, given that ex-
periences cannot be construed as attitudes towards contents (at least not in the same
37 See, for instance, Carruthers and Veillet, (2011) and, more generally, the papers in Bayne and
Montague, (2011).
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way as propositional attitudes). This is reﬂected by the fact that we can stay neutral
towards a proposition (i.e. entertain it without judging or supposing it to be true),
but not towards the experiential presentation of objects and their features. Consider
the moment in which you recognise that you have been the victim of a trompe-l’œil.
What happens then is that the objects, which a second ago seemed to exist as part
of our current environment, now appear to pertain to some depicted scene. But this
change is not due to the adoption of a different attitude towards how the objects
are presented. Rather, what gets modiﬁed is how the objects are (non-sensorily) pre-
sented – namely, as present in, or absent from, our surroundings.38
To conclude, what we have access to from the inside goes beyond the sensory (e.g.
visual) presentation of objects and their features. In particular, experiential rational-
ism is right in claiming that the rational role of perceptual experiences – that is, their
justiﬁcatory power – is salient to us in introspection. That is, it makes a difference for
us whether we are enjoying an experience that provides us with a reason for belief, or
an experience that does not. As a consequence, sceptics about intellectual or cogni-
tive aspects – and, more generally, non-sensory aspects – of the phenomenal character
of mental episodes should worry not only about the intellectual aspects of thoughts,
but also about the structural aspects of experiences.39
Indeed, the primary focus of the debate on non-sensory aspects of phenomenal
character should be on the structural aspects, mainly for two reasons. First, structural
aspects belong to all kinds of mental episode – including sensory experiences that are
widely accepted to be accessible from the inside – and are therefore more difficult
to deny than intellectual aspects, which perhaps pertain only to thoughts and other
occurrent propositional attitudes. Second, the structural aspects are more signiﬁci-
cant and fundamental than the sensory and the intellectual aspects. For the structural
aspects reﬂect the general nature of the natural kinds of mental episode concerned,
rather than the speciﬁc and contingent presentational differences among their in-
stances. In particular, the structural aspects render the rational role of the mental
episodes – whether they provide us with reasons or are themselves sensitive to reasons
– accessible from the inside (Dorsch, 2011, Introduction). The debate should there-
fore shift at least part of its attention to the structural aspects of mental episodes.
38 This, I think, is part of what is behind Hume’s suggestion that there is a fundamental divide
between perceptual experiences (i.e. ‘impressions’), on the one hand, and mnemonic and imaginative
experiences (i.e. ‘ideas of the memory and the imagination’), on the other. See also Sartre, (1940/2004,
ch. 1), Martin, (2001), Martin, (2002b) and Dorsch, (2010b) for discussion.
39 And indeed thoughts, given that judgemental thoughts or occurrent beliefs also provide us with
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